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ARGUMENT
Issue 1: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning and Analysis in Regards to
Whether the District Court Abused its Discretion in Determining that Mrs. Boyer
Was Not Awarded an Equitable Interest with Mr. Boyer in the Commercial
Building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, Where Mr. Boyer Conducts His Business.
In her brief, Mrs. Boyer quoted particular language from relevant cases regarding
equitable property division. On page 18 of her brief, Mrs. Boyer stated the following:
"Any significant disparity in the division of the remaining property should be
based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole fact that one spouse is
awarded his or her gifts of inheritance." Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476,483 (Utah
Ct. App. 2008), quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. The Stonehocker Court
was addressing the issue of the trial court providing an equitable division of
marital property, which in most instances does not include gifts or
inheritances. Id. In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "[mjarital
property is ordinarily all property acquired during the marriage and it
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties,
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn v. Dunn, 802
P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
(Appellant's brief, page 18)
In the Appellee's brief, he cites to a four (4) step process of what a Trial Court must
do when considering the division of property:
1. Determine what is martial and separate property; 2. "Consider whether there
are exceptional circumstances that overcome the general presumption that
marital property be divided equally between the parties." Id. At ^[15; 3. Assign
values to each item of marital property; 4. "Distribute the items of marital
property in a manner consistent with that distribution strategy, with a view
toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her separate life." Id.
(Appellee's brief, pages 12, 13)
4

It is clear that the commercial building located on 25 Street, in Ogden, Utah, was
marital property between Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer. The problem that Mr. Boyer faces in
his Brief, is that in regards to his analysis in the division of his interest in the commercial
building on 25th Street, he takes an approach that was not implemented or taken by the Trial
Court. As stated above from the Stonehocker v. Stonehocker and Mortensen v. Mortensen
cases, "any significant disparity in the division of the remaining property should be based on
an equitable rationale, other than on the sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts
of inheritance." Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), quoting Mortensen,
760 P.2d at 308.
The Court found that the commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, had a net
value of $20,300.00. {Amended Decree ofDivorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1> 2009, pg. 8; TT
at pg. 1065 11. 7-24.) Mrs. Boyer was not awarded any portion of the commercial building,
which was valued at the $20,300.00. Id. The Trial Court fails to find and address the
"equitable rationale" for not awarding Mrs. Boyer any interest or portion of the building on
25th Street.
In the Appellee's brief, Mr. Boyer makes several arguments and analyses that the
portion of the $20,300.00 from the building on 25th Street, should not be in any way, shape or
fashion awarded to Mrs. Boyer because the Trial Court has already factored that distribution
in regards to debt division. (Appellee's brief, page 14) The Appellee then also makes figures
5

and calculations in an attempt to show and "prove" to this Appellate Court that the Trial
Court was correct in its division, and that no overturn is necessary. (Appellee's brief, page
14) Further, the Appellee even states in his brief:
"Mr. Boyer's portion of the equity in his business, including the commercial
building, is likely less than even the $20,300.00. However, the Trial Court
considered only the value of the business, including the building at the time of
the Trial. In an exact and equal division of property, Mrs. Boyer would
receive $10,150.00 as her portion of equity in the business."
(Appellee's brief, page 14)
Further on in his brief, the Appellee then states "In an actual dollar for dollar offset,
there is an additional $29,350.00 of marital debt which Mr. Boyer must pay, after the offset.
This division allows the parties to go forward with their separate lives, as there is no longer
any equity or debt entanglement." (Appellee's brief, page 15) The Trial Court however,
never took the approach of doing a dollar for dollar division as Mr. Boyer has attempted to
do in his brief. Further, the Trial Court fails to include in its Findings of Fact, to provide the
"equitable rationale" that is required, for a significant disparity in the division of the
commercial building on 25th Street.
Paragraph 13 of the Amended Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law states as
follows:
Property: The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest
in a commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his
business. The Court finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his
business volume included the building equity of $32,000.00 that he valued his
6

business at $349,400.00. The Court finds that there were business liabilities of
$329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00. The Court orders that all of
the property from his business including the building, which the Court finds to
be $20,300.00, be awarded to Respondent. (Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, page 8, said copy of
Findings of Fact has been attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.)
In the above paragraph regarding property, the Court awarded all of the $20,300.00 of
the net value of the business to Mr. Boyer, none to Mrs. Boyer. In this finding, the Court
again fails to establish the "equitable rationale" for the disparity and the division of this
property.
Laced throughout Mr. Boyer's brief, he develops the argument that the reasoning for
the Trial Court to not award any portion of the $20,3000.00 of the value of the business to
Mr. Boyer, was because of the substantial debt that Mr. Boyer took upon himself.
(Appellee's brief, pages 14-15)
The partial interest that Mr. Boyer had in the commercial building at 204 25th Street,
where he conducts his business, which was valued at approximately $20,300.00, should be
equitably divided and apportioned to Mrs. Boyer. The Trial Court provided no "equitable
rationale" as to why said division should not occur in the amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
Issue 2: The Appellee is Incorrect on his Reasoning, as to Whether the District
Court Abused its Discretion in Not Awarding Mrs, Boyer any share of Mr, Boyer's
Retirement Accounts.
In regards to the retirement accounts of Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer stated
7

the following in her initial brief:
At the time of the parties' divorce trial, Mr. Boyer was found to have a
retirement account valued at approximately $12,500, where Mrs. Boyer was
found to have a retirement account valued at approximately $2,500. (Amended
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 9) Without any
detailed findings or analysis, the Court awarded each party their own separated
retirement account. (Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1,
2009, pg. 9)
(Appellant's brief, page 20)
Further, taken from the Appellee's brief, it is stated:
In Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), the Utah Court of Appeals
specifically addressed the unequal division of retirement benefits. The Court
explained "the primary purpose of a property division, in conjunction with an
alimony award, 'is to achieve a fair, just and equitable result between the
parties.'" Id. At f 27, quoting Haumont v. Haumont793 P. 2d 421 at 424 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). The Court further explained the "[although 'retirement
accounts are part of the marital estate and they are generally to be equitably
divided, an unequal division of marital property is justified when the trial court
memorializes in commendably detailed findings the exceptional circumstance
supporting the distribution." Id. At 27, quoting Davis v. Davis 76 P.3d 716
(Utah Ct. App. 2003).
(Appellee's brief, pages 15-16)
In his brief, Mr. Boyer reasons that the Trial Court made the correct decision in not
dividing the parties' retirement accounts, and that Mrs. Boyer received a favorable outcome
in this decision because, according to Mr. Boyer, Mr. Boyer took on more credit card debt.
(Appellee's brief, page 16) Further, Mr. Boyer then continues in his brief and quotes from a
December 3, 2009 ruling from the Court, where the Court addresses the non-division of the
8

retirement accounts. (Appellee's brief, pages 16-17) The problem that Mr. Boyer faces
here, is that after the ruling from December 3, 2009, the Court entered Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, which was signed by the Court
on March 25, 2010. (Said copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc
to June 1, 2009 has been attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.) According to the
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, the
paragraph and section involving the retirement accounts states as follows:
The Court awards each party his or her retirement accounts. Respondent's
retirement account is valued at approximately $12,500.00. Petitioner's
retirement account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the
rest of the parties' agreement with respect to personal property.
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,
2009, page 9, attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.)
Here, with the Amended Findings of Fact, the Court fails to provide any justification
with detailed findings regarding the unequal division of the retirement accounts. Here, the
Trial Court did abuse its discretion, whereupon the retirement accounts should have been
equitably divided between Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer. Unfortunately for Mr. Boyer, the Trial
Court did not enter detailed findings regarding this inequitable division in its Amended
Findings of Fact. As such, Mrs. Boyer should be awarded an equitable distribution or proper
offset to Mr. Boyer's retirement.
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Issue 3: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning on Whether the Trial Court
Abused its Discretion in Ordering that the Alimony Awarded to Mrs. Boyer Be
Structured to be Reduced Oyer a Certain Period of Time.
As indicated in the Appellant's brief as well as the Appellee's brief, both recognize
the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "generally, it is true that, because of uncertainty of
future events, prospective changes to alimony are disfavored." Richardson v. Richardson,
201 P.3d 942 a t ! 10 (Utah 2008).
Mr. Boyer then further states in his brief the following:
Ms. Boyer's improved financial future is fairly certain. The trial court found
that she could work full time and earn the same wage or a higher wage in the
future. The Utah Supreme Court found that when "the future event is certain
to occur within a known time frame, then prospective changes are
appropriate." Id. Atf 10.
(Appellee's brief, page 19)
Mrs. Boyer asserts that working full time is not the equivalent of having a fairly
certain financial future. Mrs. Boyer further asserts that there is not anything about her
financial future which is certain. In regards to Mrs. Boyer, the Trial Court made no specific
findings that a future event is certain to occur within a specific known timeframe,
specifically, there was no findings from the Trial Court that corresponded or correlated with
the tier reduction of alimony in Mrs. Boyer's case.
In regards to the alimony Finding of Fact, it was stated as follows:
10

To equalize the parties' standard of living , the Court orders the Respondent to
pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5)
years, commencing on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to
$1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which
time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at
the remarriage or death of the Petitioner.
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,
2009, pages 7-8, attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.)
The Trial Court fails to address in its findings, its reasoning as to using the tiered
structure of alimony with periodic reductions. The prospectively reduced alimony after
certain time periods, as awarded by the Trial Court, should not have been issued as such. The
Trial Court failed to provide adequate findings and reasonings for this reduction.
Issue 4: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning on the Issue of Whether the
District Court Made a Clear Error in the Award of Alimony or the Termination Date of
Alimony.
Mr. Boyer was incorrect in his reasoning in his brief when he claimed that Mrs. Boyer
did not adequately marshal the evidence in support of her appeal issue of the Trial Court
having discrepancy date on when alimony should terminate. The following is a list of
evidence that was marshaled to support Mrs. Boyer's issue:
1. The Court ordered Mr. Boyer to pay Mrs. Boyer $1,428.00 in alimony each month
for a period of five (5) years, commencing July 1, 2008. (Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) (As contained in Appellant's brief, page 23)
2. The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00 per month on July 1,
11

2013, for another five (5) years (contained in Appellant's brief, page 23) and then the
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31,2015, at which time the alimony
shall terminate. (Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) (As
contained in Appellant's brief, page 23)
3. The Court awarded Mrs. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,428 per month for a
period of five years, commencing on July 1, 2008. (As contained in Appellant's brief, page

4. The Court then awarded alimony for another five years, to commence on July 1,
2013, at $1,000 per month. (As contained in Appellant's brief, page 24)
5. The Court then reduced the alimony award even further to $800 per month to take
place after the alimony award of $1,000 has run its course, but the Court also terminates the
$800 alimony award December 31, 2015. (As contained in Appellant's brief, page 24)
Mr. Boyer in his appeal states the following:
Ms. Boyer alleges that the trial court erred in terminating alimony on
December 31, 2015 because the trial court also provided for alimony for two
periods of five years. When the trial court issued its oral ruling regarding
alimony, counsel for Mr. Boyer recognized this possible discrepancy and
specifically asked when alimony in the amount of $800.00 terminates. The
court clearly stated that alimony terminates on December 31, 2015. (R. 616)
Following written objections by Ms. Boyer and an additional hearing, in its
written ruling of December 3, 2009, the trial court again stated that alimony
terminates on December 31, 2015.
Therefore, the record is clear that the trial court state that alimony would end
on December 31, 2015. What is not clear is the amount of the alimony award
12

between July 1, 2013 and December 31, 2015. It is possible that the trial court
meant for the alimony to last for ten years and six months and that the court
made the error in it calculation of December 31, 2015.
However, even if the court made an error in calculating when alimony reduces
or ends, such an error is not against the clear weight of evidence and therefore
not clearly erroneous.
(As contained in Appellee's brief, page 24)
Mrs. Boyer respectfully disagrees with Mr. Boyer, and argues that the Trial Courts'
error in determining when alimony ends is a clear error. Mrs. Boyer had stated the following:
It was the Court's intention that Mrs. Boyer receive alimony at $l,000.00for
five years beginning July 1, 2013, hence the five year time period at the $ 1,000
rate would cease July 1, 2018. It is clear that the Court intended Mrs. Boyer to
receive alimony for ten (10) years at different amounts, and then for her to
receive alimony for another time period at $800.00 a month. The error here is
that alimony cannot terminate on December 31,2015, and also continue to July
2018, and continue even further past that date with a different amount.
(As contained in Appellant's brief, page 25)
The alimony provision contained in the Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc
to June 1, 2009 states as follows:
To equalize the parties' standard of living , the Court orders the Respondent to
pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5)
years, commencing on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to
$1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which
time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at
the remarriage or death of the Petitioner.
(Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,2009, page 8, attached
to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit B.)
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The award of alimony given by the Trial Court is contrary to the Court's intent. A
clear error was made by the Trial Court, where the Court awarded alimony for two (2)
different time periods of five (5) years each, with alimony to also continue even after the two
(2) sets of five (5) year time frames.
Issue 5: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning as to Whether the District
Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Not Addressing the Issue of Fault in Setting the
Alimony Award.
Under this section in Mr. Boyer's brief, he argues that the Trial Court is under no
obligation to consider fault in regards to the alimony awards. (See Appellee's brief, page 23)
Further, Mr. Boyer continues in his brief under this issue, and states that the Trial Court on
this matter did in fact consider fault in regards to this alimony award by referencing the
following statement: "The Court considered fault in awarding alimony. In the Court's
opinion, this was not a long-term marriage, warranting permanent alimony." (See Appellee's
brief, page 24)
However, despite what was included in the Court's ruling, the actual Decree of
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law did not contain any language in
regards to a finding of fault. The Findings of Fact in this case were in fact amended, as well
as the Decree of Divorce, and fault is not included. The Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc
pro Tunc to June 1, 2009 and the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc
pro Tunc to June 1, 2009 are identical in regards to the provisions regarding alimony. They
14

state the following in regards to alimony:
To equalize the parties' standard of living , the Court orders the Respondent to
pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5)
years, commencing on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to
$1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the
alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which
time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at
the remarriage or death of the Petitioner.
(Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, page 8-9,
attached to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit B and Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law Nun Pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, page 8-9, attached to
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C.)
It is clear from the Amended Decree of Divorce and Amended Findings in this case
that fault was not considered in the alimony determination award.

As indicated in

Petitioner's initial brief, taken from the Riley v. Riley case, the Court stated the following:

Husband's engagement in extramarital affairs and his prolonged deceitful
conduct that led to the divorce, present precisely the type of situation where the
legislature intended the trial court to consider fault. Id. At 88.
(As contained in Appellant's brief, page 27)
It is apparent that according to case law, that the Trial Court should, at a minimum, at
least consider fault in the type of situation that Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer were involved in,
where there were extramarital affairs.
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Issue 6: The Appellee is Incorrect in His Reasoning of Whether the Court Did
Not Abuse its Discretion in its Alimony Award by Not Considering Mrs. Boyer's Health
Conditions as a Result of Obtaining a Social/Venereal Disease from Mr. Boyer and
Therefore Awarding Permanent Alimony to Her.
In the Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, and the Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc pro Tunc to June 1, 2009, the Trial Court
failed to address the fault of Mr. Boyer in regards to Mrs. Boyer contracting a social/veneral
disease from Mr. Boyer's unfaithfulness.
In his brief, Mr. Boyer muddies the issues, where he calls into question the legitimacy
of Mrs. Boyer's health problems, as well as other men that she had sexual relations with.
(Appellee's brief, page 25)
As already contained in Mrs. Boyer's initial brief, several factors and much evidence
had been marshaled in support that the Trial Court abused its discretion in not considering
Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as a result of obtaining a social/venereal disease through Mr.
Boyer.
1. Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery. (See
Appellant's brief, page 27)
2. During the marriage, Mrs. Boyer contracted a sexually transmitted disease from
Mr. Boyer. (See Appellant's brief, page 28)
3. Mrs. Boyer, as a result of her sexually transmitted disease, had to have surgery.
(See Appellant's brief, page 28)
16

Despite the information that is provided above to support the Trial Court considering
Mrs. Boyer's health conditions, the Court failed to mention it in its Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, and also did not address it in
its Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009.

Contrary to what is

contained in Mr. Boyer's brief, Mrs. Boyer is not seeking to punish Mr. Boyer. (See
Appellee's brief, page 26) Rather, Mrs. Boyer argues that the Trial Court simply abused its
discretion in its alimony award by not considering Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as
indicated throughout this issue. The Trial Court never made any specific findings or
references regarding Mr. Boyer's fault, specifically in him committing adultery. The fault
aspect should have been factored into the alimony analysis and calculation, but was not.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Boyer seeks an equitable interest or offset of the partial interest that Mr. Boyer
has on the 25th Street building. (204 25th Street, Ogden, Utah). The Court failed to provide an
"equitable rationale" in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended
Decree of Divorce.
Mrs. Boyer seeks a "Woodward" share of Mr. Boyer's reti^cm^^. The Court failed to

<\(\v"

''

provide any justification in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Amended Decree of Divorce.
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Mrs. Boyer seeks that alimony structure not reduce over time, but rather stay at the
higher amount, and also have a clarification of when alimony terminates. The Trial Court
failed to provide any reasoning in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Amended Decree of Divorce.
Mrs. Boyer seeks a permanent alimony award, however, at a minimum, she seeks to
have the Court determine how long her alimony award is for, and should not be shorter than
the length of the marriage. The intent of the Trial Court was clear, in that alimony was to be
awarded at a minimum often (10) years, two (2) five (5) year amounts, and then to continue
beyond that at a different amount.
Mrs. Boyer seeks the Court to include "fault" in its alimony determination. The Court
provided no reasoning in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Amended
Decree of Divorce regarding fault of Mr. Boyer, where case law is clear that this was a case
where a Court should consider fault.
DATED this _ 2 3 _ day of December, 2010.

KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC

Rand G. Lunceford
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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